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THE TRIAL OF CHARLES I: A
SESQUITRICENTENNIAL REFLECTION
Louis J. Sirico, Jr.*

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 20, 1787, deputies to the Constitutional Convention debated whether the national executive should be
"removeable on impeachment and conviction for malpractice or neglect of duty." 1 Some, like Gouverneur Morris of
Pennsylvania, argued against impeachment: "Besides, who
is to impeach? Is the impeachment to suspend his function.
[sic] If it is not the mischief will go on. If it is the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and
will render the Executive dependent on those who are to
impeach." 2
Benjamin Franklin argued that impeachment benefited
the executive: "History furnishes one example only of a
first Magistrate being formally brought to public Justice.
Every body cried out [against] this as unconstitutional. "3
Franklin pointed out that the alternative had a drawback:
"What was the practice before this in cases where the chief
Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse
was had to assassination in [which] he was not only deprived of his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his
character." 4 Impeachment thus would benefit both the citizen and the executive: "It [would] be the best way there*

Professor, Villanova University, School of Law.
1. See James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, reprinted in Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 64 (Yale
U. Press, 1911) ("Notes"). The deputies to the Convention had yet to settle on the final
language or even on the title of "President." The Constitution makes the chief executive
impeachable for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." U.S.
Const., Art. II,§ 4. The Framers did not discuss lesser penalties such as censure.
2. Notes at 64-65 (cited in note 1).
3. Id. at 65.
4. Id.
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fore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the Executive when his misconduct should deserve
it, and for his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused." 5
In referring to "the only first Magistrate brought to
public justice," Franklin alluded to Charles I of England,
the second Stuart king, who, in 1649, was tried and sentenced to beheading.6 Franklin could not have supported
his argument with a more inappropriate illustration.
Charles confronted a High Court of Justice that the House
of Commons had created to issue a predetermined verdict.
When the King appeared before the High Court, he could
not present his defense. By Franklin's time, English legal
authorities had long since agreed that Charles was the victim of murder. 7
The hindsight of three hundred fifty years inevitably
leads us to reflect on the subsequent reign of Oliver
Cromwell, the Restoration of Charles II, and the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, which ended the Stuart line and established parliamentary supremacy. However, a narrower focus on Charles's trial and beheading is sufficient to teach us
lessons on two subjects: first, how lawlessness seeks to impersonate the rule of law, and, second, as Gouverneur
Morris recognized, how excessive power in one branch of
government can destabilize a political system and even destroy it.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A friend once described Charles as a very bad king, but
a very good martyr. 8 Like his father, James I, he believed
5. ld.
6. Because England had yet to adopt the Gregorian calendar, the English would
have dated Charles's execution January 30, 1648. Under the Gregorian calendar, which
enjoyed wide use in Europe, the date was February 9, 1649. Today, the English date the
event as January 30, 1649. See C.V. Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles 264 (Macmillan Co., 1964) (published in Great Britain with minor revisions and different pagination as The Trial of Charles I (Penguin Books, 1983)). Despite the unfortunate title,
Dame Veronica Wedgwood's book offers the best detailed narrative on Charles's latter
days.
7. See F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 282 (Cambridge U.
Press, 1908).
8. The brief history that I recount is uncontroversial. Recent historical narratives
include Charles Carlton, Charles I: The Personal Monarch (Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1983); Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (Yale U. Press, 1992); and Michael
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in the divine right of kings. This position aggravated his
continuing conflicts with parliaments increasingly dominated by the Puritans. After four disastrous parliaments,
Charles ruled for eleven years without calling another.
During this interim, he managed to heighten his unpopularity. Not only did he support Archbishop Laud in imposing high church uniformity on religious observances, he
also raised revenues by exacting duties and dues without
calling Parliament.
The cost of Charles's war against Scotland finally
forced him to summon Parliament. The House of Commons was uncooperative, and Charles quickly dissolved it.
The increasing financial demands of the war soon compelled him to call another Parliament and make numerous
concessions concerning his prerogatives and methods of
governance. Nonetheless, conflict continued and reached a
climax when Charles sent armed men into the House of
Commons to arrest the five members most hostile to him.
By 1642, Charles and Parliament had begun a civil war,
which ended in Charles's defeat. Numerous attempts to
reach a negotiated settlement failed. The army now controlled Parliament and successfully insisted on trying the
King for treason. As planned, Charles was convicted. On
the scaffold, he delivered a stirring speech declaring that
his loyalty to the rule of law made him the martyr of the
people. This oft-quoted excerpt sums up his position and
demonstrates his appeal to his supporters:
For the people-and truly I desire their liberty and freedom
as much as anybody whomsoever-but I must tell you that
their liberty and their freedom consists in having of government those laws by which their life and their goods may be
most their own. It is not for having share in government, sirs;
B. Young, Charles I (St. Martin's Press, 1997). A recent documentary history of Charles's
last days is David Iagomarsino and Charles J. Wood, eds., The Trial of Charles I: A
Documentary History (U. Press of New England, 1989). For a review of modem scholarship on Charles's reign, see Young, Charles I at 1-13.
Some historians blame Charles's character defects for his failure as king. See, e.g.,
Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I at 954; Young, Charles I at 180. Others blame the
English Civil War on socio-economic transformations in English society that resulted in a
class war. See, e.g., Christopher Hill, The English Revolution: I640 at 11, 65-67 (Lawrence & Wishart, 3d ed. 1985). Still others blame it on an institutional breakdown of administration by both the Crown and Parliament. See, e.g., Conrad Russell, Parliaments
and English Politics: I62I-I629 at 423 (Clarendon Press, 1979). Others place the blame
on factional and irresponsible parliaments. See, e.g., J.P. Kenyon, Stuart England 44-46,
84-85,97, 107 (Allen Lane, 1978).
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that is nothing pertaining to them. A subject and a sovereign
are clean different things. And therefore until they do that- I
mean, that you do put the people in that liberty as I say-certainly they will never enjoy themselves. Sirs, it was for this
that now I am come here. If I would have given way to an arbitrary way for to have all laws changed according to the
power of the sword, I needed not to have come here. And
therefore I tell you-and I pray God it be not laid to your
charge-that I am the martyr of the people. 9

Charles's death marked the beginning of the elevenyear Interregnum in which Oliver Cromwell ruled as Lord
Protector. After Cromwell's death, England turned to
Charles's son and acknowledged him as Charles II. The
exhumed heads of Cromwell, his son-in law, and the High
Court's President were placed on public display atop
Westminster Hall. The anniversary of Charles's execution
became a date of commemoration on the liturgical calendar of the Anglican Church. 10
Ill. LAW AND LAWLESSNESS

For the period surrounding the trial, the most powerful
theme is the exaltation of form over substance: The army
and its Puritan allies believed they could not execute
Charles without appearing to follow acceptable legal procedure.
The very idea of trying a king must have appalled
English citizens. The concerns that Gouverneur Morris
raised in 1787 about impeaching an American executive
also plagued them-and with a far greater intensity. They
9. Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 142 (cited in note 8).
10. Charles was the only post-Reformation figure that the Book of Common Prayer
recognized as a saint. It is not surprising that John Keble, a founder of the AngloCatholic Oxford Movement, would agree that Charles was a martyr who sacrificed his
life rather than compromise the faith and order of the Anglican Church. See Geoffrey
Rowell, The Vision Glorious: Themes and Personalities of the Catholic Revival in Anglicanism 22 (Oxford U. Press, 1983). In 1831 he commemorated Charles's death by
preaching that "it must ever seem quite as natural, that the Church of England should
keep this day, as it is that Christ's universal Church should keep the day of St. Stephen's
martyrdom." !d. (quoting John Keble, Sermons, Academic and Occasional (J.H. Parker,
1847)).
Queen Victoria, who did not care for Charles, removed the commemoration day
from the Calendar of the Book of Common Prayer. See O.C. Edwards, Jr., Anglican
Pastoral Tradition, in Stephen Sykes and John Booty, eds., The Study of Anglicanism 343
(Fortress Press, 1988). Her action prompted the founding of the Society of King Charles
the Martyr, which promotes the commemoration of the date of his death.
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were contemplating impeaching not just the constitutional
head of govemment, 11 but also a hereditarr
monarch, who,
some believed, could heal with his touch. 1 The Cromwellians tried to overcome objections by disposing of the King
through the formal legal process of a trial.
In putting Charles on trial, the Cromwellians knew
that, at the least, they were exploring the outer limits of the
established legal system. Thus, a great many of those appointed to the High Court were unwilling to serve. 13 Even
before the trial, the Cromwellians were uncertain what
course to take if Charles challenged the High Court's jurisdiction over him, as he did. 14
The importance of the appearance of legality is, in itself, remarkable. At the time of these events, the House of
Commons contained no Royalists, and the Presbyterian
members declined to go along with the Cromwellians in
bringing Charles to trial. The army responded by purging
the Presbyterians from Parliament and imprisoning fortyone of them. Now Commons could legally pass the ordinance ordering the trial. 15
When the House of Lords refused to consent to a trial,
Commons decided that it could act unilaterally. It unanimously declared that as representative of the people, it had
11. Britain, of course, has an unwritten constitution, that is, an accepted political
order, which like other constitutions, changes over time. As Kermit Hall has written, "the
British constitution was a collection of documents- Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and
the Act of Supremacy, for example-as well as customary practices that had historically
limited the government's exercise of arbitrary power." Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mir·
ror: Law in American History 51 (Oxford U. Press, 1989). As Russell Kirk has intimated,
a successful written constitution and an unwritten one enjoy more similarities than dif·
ferences:
Constitutions are something more than lines written upon parchment. When a
written constitution endures, and most of them don't endure very long, that
document has been derived successfully from long established customs, beliefs,
statutes, and interests, and has reflected a political order already accepted, tacitly at least, by the dominant element among the people. Constitutions, in short,
are not invented; they grow.... A constitution without deep roots is no true
constitution at all, and it will not endure.
Russell A. Kirk, The Conservative Tradition, in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., The Political
Theory of the Constitution 40 (U. Press of America, 1990).
12. See Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles at 10,68 (cited in note 6).
13. See Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 42 (cited in note 8) (the
High Court issued warrants summoning absent court commissioners); Wedgwood, A
Coffin for King Charles at 104-13 (cited in note 6) (noting poor attendance and the defection of several prominent individuals).
14. See Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles at 105, 139, 150-51 (cited in note 6).
15. See Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 14-15 (cited in note 8);
Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles at 38-43 (cited in note 6).
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the supreme power and could make law without the consent or concurrence of the King or House of Lords.' 6 Trying Charles required that Commons create and staff a special High Court. Initially, the highest ranking judicial
figures in England were to preside over the High Court: the
Lord Chief Justice of England, the Lord Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer.17 When they declined, the position went to John
Bradshaw, an undistinguished jurist sitting in Chester and
Wales.' 8 When the Attorney General pleaded illness, the
job of prosecution fell to John Cook, an obscure lawyer.' 9
The High Court's key positions were thus staffed by relatively unknown lawyers, but lawyers nonetheless.
The High Court even tried to create an aura of legitimacy by the way it designed its trappings. A committee of
the Court took care in selecting gowns for the court officers, determining the ceremonial protocol, and arranging
for a mace and a sword to precede the Lord President into
court. 20 On the clerks's table lay a copy of the charge and
the mace and sword crossing one another. 21
What make the story more than the tale of a kangaroo
court are the sincerity of the regicides and the personality
of the King. Charles played to the ultimate jury of history
and emerged victorious. The King challenged the High
Court's jurisdiction and refused to plead. The High Court
could not cope with this anticipated claim other than to insist repeatedly that it had jurisdiction and that Charles
should answer the substantive charge. On three occasions,
16.

See Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 22-23 (cited in note 8).
ld. at 36.
See id. at 37. For a portrait and thumbnail biography, see id. at 36.
For a portrait and thumbnail biography, see id. at 88.
20. See id. at 43. Here is a description of the beginning of the first day of trial
(January 20, 1649):
On Saturday ... the Lord President of the High Court of Justice with near four
score of the members of the said court, having sixteen gentlemen with partizans
and a Sword and a Mace with their and other officers of the said court marching
before them, came to the place ordered to be prepared for their sitting at the
west end of the Great Hall at Westminster, where the Lord President in a crimson velvet chair fixed in the midst of the court placed himself, having a desk
with a crimson velvet cushion before him, the rest of the members placing
themselves on each side of him upon the several seats or benches prepared and
hung with scarlet for that purpose, and the partizans dividing themselves on
each side of the court before them.
ld. at 58-60.
21. See id. at 60. For an engraving showing the High Court in session, see id. at 59.
17.
18.
19.
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Bradshaw responded by ordering the King's removal from
the courtroom. 22 Charles's dignity and restrained eloquence contrasted favorably with the excessively zealous
p~osecution and the Court's refusal to let him speak his
ptece.
Charles tied his jurisdictional defense to a far larger
theme: protecting the people's liberties. He stood for law
against lawlessness, even lawlessness dressed in the garb of
legitimacy. Charles thus showed that when lawless conduct
seeks acceptance by mimicking lawful conduct, it fails to
reach its goal.
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY

According to Charles's argument, a rump Parliament
created a court to try a king and thus wrongfully claimed
the power to alter the kingdom's constitutional structure of
government. Such illegitimate institutions and lawless
conduct, Charles maintained, threatened all English citizens.23 The King thus laid the groundwork for his claim,
later widely accepted, that he was the martyr of the people.
Seven years earlier, Charles had also challenged a reallocation of power as threatening the stability of the English Constitution. In 1642, the King issued "His Majesty's
Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of
Parliament," a polemic declaring that England had a mixed
government consisting of three estates: the King, the Lords,
and the Commons. 24 He argued the importance of keeping
a balance among them. According to his argument, Commons was upsetting the equipoise by demanding too much
power.
According to Charles's argument, England was governed by a shared sovereignty of the King, Lords, and
Commons, as opposed to a condescending monarchy. 25
22. See Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles at 168 (cited in note 6).
23. See, e.g., Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 86, 112, 142 (cited in
note 8).
24. See Douglas W. Kmiec and Stephen B. Presser, The American Constitutional
Order 51-53 (Anderson Publishing, 1998); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment:
Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 361-66 (Princeton U.
Press, 1975).
25. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment at 361 (cited in note 24); Gordon S.
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 at 199, 347 (U. of North Caro-
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Given the King's political ideology, he could not have believed the argument. 26 Nonetheless, the notion of mixed
government quickly became the paradigm for the political
system. 27 American revolutionaries would later argue that
the British government had upset the balance in mixed
government by encroaching on the colonial assemblies and
interfering with the internal affairs of the colonies. 28
During the American Constitutional Convention, the
delegates faced the question of how to maintain a balance
of power between the departments of government and still
create a stable government. Their problem differed from
that of seventeenth century English constitutionalists,
whose notion of mixed government was of a unified polity
of monarchy, aristocracy, and the people, that is, government by "Crown-in-Parliament." 29 American thinkers had
dispensed with the idea of a unified government and
adopted Montesquieu's notion of separation of powers,
which allocated separate functions to the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of government.30 Despite the
difference, the American deliberations were reminiscent of
the controversies of 1649. In both the English and American situations, the deliberators had to determine the power
relationships within the polity and the functions of the political powers. For example, in defining the function of the
executive, Gouverneur Morris seemed to echo Charles in
asserting that the executive should be the "guardian of the
people" against legislative tyranny. 3' In contrast, Roger
lina Press, 1969).
26. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment at 361-66 (cited in note 24).
27. See id.
28. See Wood, Creation of the American Republic at 200-02 (cited in note 25).
29. See, e.g., Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Sec/arum: The Intellectual Origins of
the Constitution 80-83 (U. Press of Kansas, 1985); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings:
Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 245-SO (Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).
30. See Rakove, Original Meanings at 248-SO (cited in note 29). The idea of a separation and balance of equal tripartite political entities harks back at least to the Roman
stoic Polybius. See Susan Ford Wiltshire, Greece, Rome, and the Bill of Rights 127 (U. of
Oklahoma Press, 1992).
31. One great object of the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize [and] perpetuate themselves; and
will seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion or convulsion for
that purpose. It is necessary then that the Executive ~agistrat~ sh?uld be the
guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, [agamst]_Leg~sl~uve tyran~y,
against the Great & the wealthy who m the course of thmgs will necessanly
compose-the Legislative body.
Notes at 52 (cited in note 1). The notion is also reminiscent of Viscount Bolinbroke's
idea of a patriot king who rises above politics to champion the public good. See Rakove,
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Sherman of Connecticut stated that he "considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for
carrying the will of the Legislature into effect." 32
Underlying three issues faced by the Constitution's
drafters was the intractable question of how to guarantee
the executive's independence from the legislative branch
while still placing checks on the executive. The issues were
how to select the executive, whether and how to impeach
and convict the executive, and whether and how the executive could veto acts of the legislative branch. In each case,
the debates were extensive, and in at least two cases, the
difficulty of the issue resulted in an awkward compromise:
the electoral college with close contests referred to Congress and a cumbersome impeachment process involving
impeachment by the House and a trial by the Senate. Both
issues continue to be subjects of modern public debate.
The continuing controversy demonstrates the great difficulty in allocating authority within a political system.
Separation of powers and checks and balances are not always harmonious doctrines.
The Cromwellians also faced the question of how to
check the executive, but in a more challenging setting.
While America's Framers were engaged in creating a new
political order, the Cromwellians had to stand an existing
one on its head. They sincerely believed that removing the
King from office was essential to the nation's survival and
that executing him was essential to prevent him from reclaiming the throne. The method they chose had to be
credible to English citizens and to themselves. The laws of
England, however, offered no mechanism for removing and
executing a king. Therefore, they had to create such a
mechanism.
A credible mechanism would have to parallel mechanisms that the culture already accepted. It also would have
to enjoy the sanction of either a traditional political
authority or a new one with some claim to legitimacy. The
Cromwellians therefore had Parliament manufacture a trial
court. The Parliament, however, was a rump, and the trial
Original Meanings at 247-48 (cited in note 29).
32. Notes at 65 (cited in note 1). Of course, the notion of the Executive developed
over the course of the Constitutional Convention. For a brief summary of the competing
VISIOns and the Convention's resolution, see Fred Barbash, The Founding: A Dramatic
Account of the Writing of the Constitution 175-83 (Linden Press, 1987).
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was rigged. By seeking consistency with the existing political order and paradoxically claiming its illegitimacy, the
Cromwellians placed themselves in an impossible predicament. Removing the king necessarily altered the political
system by allocating extensive authority to Parliament, and
an illegitimate Parliament at that. The inevitable consequence was a disastrous interregnum.33
V. CONCLUSION

In his only recorded speech at the Virginia convention
to ratify the Constitution, Zechariah Johnson referred to
Charles's execution and its aftermath. 34 Though Johnson
had no difficulty with the decision to execute Charles, he
was deeply troubled by the ensuing events:
For the want of an efficient and judicious system of republican government, confusion and anarchy took place. Men became so lawless, so destitute of principle, and so utterly ungovernable, that, to avoid greater calamities, they were driven
to the expedient of sending for the son of that monarch whom
35
they had beheaded, that he might become their master.

He feared that unless America followed up on its
revolution with a constitution, liberty would also be in danger: "This is like our situation in some degree. It will completely resemble it, should we lose our liberty as they did.
It warns and cautions us to shun their fate, by avoiding the
causes which produced it." 36
To avoid such confusion and anarchy, Johnson argued
for the safeguard of the proposed constitution. His historical analogy may have overstated the point; the United
States enjoyed the stability of state governments and the
imperfect Articles of Confederation. However, Johnson
discerned the dangers that arise from disrupting the political order as the Cromwellians had done. No matter how
strenuously they tried, they could not disguise the radical
nature of that conduct.

33. See Rakove, Original Meanings at 246 (cited in note 29).
34. See Jonathan Elliot, ed., 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 648-49 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1866).
35. Id. at 649.
36. ld.
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I leave open the question whether we can distinguish
between Charles's execution and such other upheavals as
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the American Revolution
of 1776, and the French Revolution of 1789. As Edmund
Burke, the prominent Whig statesman observed: "The
speculative line of demarcation, where obedience ought to
end and resistance must begin, is faint, obscure, and not
easily definable." 37 Whatever one's assessment of Charles,
Burke's line of demarcation was plainly crossed in the way
the king was tried and executed.
Three hundred fifty years later, we continue to see
events reminiscent of Charles's trial. Both corrupt governments and terrorists mimic the forms of legal proceedings without regard to the purpose of the rule of law.
When an accepted governmental structure of a society becomes inconvenient, they reconstruct or destroy it.
Charles's trial suggests two lessons and a moral. The first
lesson: People can amend and manipulate law to justify even the
most radical conduct. The second lesson: The rule of law is so
ingrained, at least in Anglo-American culture, that it compels us
to conduct ourselves so that our actions arguably conform to it.
37. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 3 The Writings and
Speeches of Edmund Burke 270-71 (Little, Brown and Co., 1901) ("Burke's Speeches").
Burke continued:
It is not a single act or a single event which determines it. Governments must be
abused and deranged indeed, before it can be thought of; and the prospect of
the future must be as bad as the experience of the past. When things are in that
lamentable condition, the nature of the disease is to indicate the remedy to
those whom Nature has qualified to administer in extremities this critical, ambiguous, bitter potion to a distempered state .... (A) revolution will be the very
last resource of the thinking and the good.
ld. at 271. Burke favored the Glorious Revolution: "The Revolution was made to preserve our ancient, indisputable laws and liberties and that ancient constitution of government which is our only security for law and liberty." Id. (emphasis in original). Here, he
reflected general British sentiment. See Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution:
The Convention of 1787 and the First Congress 28 & n.18 (Pennsylvania State U. Press,
1993). Burke also sympathized with American discontent as evidenced by his Speech on
Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies (1775) in 2 Burke's Speeches at
99 and his Letter to John Farrand John Harris, Esqrs., the Sheriffs of the City of Bristol
(1777), in id. at 187. After the American Revolution began, Burke urged a peaceful settlement. See Carl B. Cone, 1 Burke and the Nature of Politics: The Age of the American
Revolution 302-03 (U. of Kentucky Press, 1957). Perhaps his most famous work is his denunciation of the French Revolution, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), in 3
Burke's Speeches 231. Burke was distressed by the actions of the Cromwellians and execution of Charles. See Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Gilbert Elliott (Sept. 22, 1793),
in P.J. Marshall and John A. Woods, eds., 7 The Correspondence of Edmund Burke 43132 (Cambridge U. Press, 1%8). For an excellent summary of Burkean political philosophy, see Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 619,642-59 (1994).
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The moral: When we manipulate the law to suit our needs, truth
and class nevertheless sometimes win out, at least in the long
run.

